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Abstract: This article examines whether the asymmetric timeliness measure
captures delayed recognition of bad news and in which manner this delayed
recognition occurs. I find that negative earnings changes of firms with high
asymmetric timeliness have significant predictive power for future earnings
changes of low-asymmetric-timeliness firms in the same industry. In contrast,
the negative earnings changes of firms with low asymmetric timeliness do not
have predictive power for future earnings changes of high-asymmetric-timeliness
firms in the same industry. Moreover, neither type of firm has predictive power
for the other group when earnings changes are positive. This result suggests that
high-asymmetric-timeliness firms recognize the effects of a common negative
shock before low-asymmetric-timeliness firms. Further, low-asymmetric-timeli-
ness firms have more frequent and smaller negative earnings changes, suggesting
that the eventual recognition of negative news “trickles out” as opposed to being
recognized in an “earnings bath.”
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INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric timeliness (AT) is defined as the requirement for a higher standard for
the recognition of good news than bad news in earnings (Basu, 1997). An implication
of this definition is that firms with low AT delay the recognition of bad news in earn-
ings. This article provides evidence for the existence of this delayed recognition and
the manner in which it occurs using an AT measure suggested by Kahn and Watts
(2009). This evidence lends support to the validity of an AT measure based on Basu’s
(1997) nonlinear regression of earnings on returns.
I find that negative earnings changes of firms with high AT have significant predic-
tive power for future earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry. In con-
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trast, the negative earnings changes of firms with low AT do not have significant pre-
dictive power for future earnings changes of high-AT firms in the same industry.
Moreover, neither type of firm has predictive power for the other group when earnings
changes are positive. This result suggests that high-AT firms recognize the effects of a
common negative shock before low-AT firms. In addition, I find that low-AT firms
have more frequent and smaller negative earnings changes, suggesting that the eventu-
al recognition of negative news “trickles out” as opposed to being recognized in an
“earnings bath.”
AT is one of the key characteristics of accounting. Research relates Basu (1997)’s
measure of AT to contracting efficiency, persistence of special items, cost of capital,
and corporate governance (Frankel & Roychowdhury, 2007; Zhang, 2008; LaFond &
Watts, 2008; Francis & Martin, 2010). Recent studies, however, raise questions about
the reliability of this measure, arguing that it is biased by economic events and disclo-
sure policy (Givoly, Hayne, & Natarajan, 2007). Dietrich, Mueller, and Riedl (2007)
also question whether this measure captures delayed recognition of earnings. Using a
test that does not employ stock returns, I provide evidence that Basu’s measure cap-
tures the tendency to delay the recognition of bad news in earnings following the defi-
nition of AT.
Unrecognized bad news will eventually affect earnings, because cash flows are
more highly correlated with earnings over long windows (e.g., Dechow, 2004). An
effective AT measure should be able to detect this delayed recognition of common bad
news across firms. Thus, I predict that negative earnings changes of high-AT firms
will precede negative earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry if the
measure is effective.
Following Khan and Watts (2009), I measure firm-specific AT based on Basu’s
nonlinear regression of earnings on returns. Using this measure, I find negative earn-
ings changes of high-AT firms predict earnings changes of low-AT firms in the next
period within the same industry. However, I find that negative earnings changes of
low-AT firms do not predict earnings changes of high-AT firms. These results provide
evidence that the AT measure detects cross-sectional differences in the speed of recog-
nition of bad news.
Given that firms with low AT delay recognition of bad news, I investigate how this
retained bad news makes its appearance in earnings. Firms can choose either to recog-
nize the accumulated bad news at one time (“earnings bath”) or to recognize it slowly
(“trickling out”). The method chosen has implications for earnings forecasts. “Earn-
ings bath” firms will have less frequent but greater-magnitude negative earnings
changes, while “trickling out” firms will have more frequent and smaller-magnitude
negative earnings changes. These results suggest that low-AT firms trickle out the past
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unrecognized bad news. I also provide evidence that this “trickling out” is driven by
accruals.
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides evidence that
AT measured by nonlinear regression of earnings on returns captures firms’ differen-
tial timeliness in recognizing bad news. Given the recent debate on the validity of the
Basu measure (Givoly et al., 2007; Dietrich et al., 2007), it is important to document
whether this measure captures the differential timeliness of recognizing bad news fol-
lowing the definition of AT. Second, the study also contributes to the conservatism lit-
erature by providing evidence that low-AT firms tend to recognize accumulated bad
news slowly rather than all at once. Understanding how firms ultimately recognize the
accumulated bad news has implications for the prediction of future earnings and sug-
gests an explanation for why firms choose not to recognize bad news promptly.
The remaining sections of the article develop testable hypotheses, describe research
design and sample, provide empirical results of hypotheses tests, and offer conclusions.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Conservatism is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of
profits versus losses (Watts, 2003a, 2003b). In the empirical literature, this is interpret-
ed as representing “the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification
to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses” (Basu, 1997).
This definition implies that conservative firms will have greater timeliness in recog-
nizing bad news than in recognizing good news, a phenomenon known as asymmetric
timeliness (AT) (Frankel & Roychowdhury, 2007). Using the AT measure suggested
by Basu (1997), literature shows that AT provides firms with benefits such as contract-
ing efficiency, reduced cost of capital, and better governance (Zhang, 2008; LaFond &
Watts, 2008; Francis & Martin, 2010). However, recent literature argues that this AT
measure does not properly capture firms’ differential timeliness and has an economet-
ric issue (Givoly et al., 2007; Dietrich et al., 2007).
One way to verify the validity of the AT measure is to test whether it correctly cap-
tures firms’ cross-sectional difference in the speed of recognizing bad news. Given
common bad news, low-AT firms are expected to recognize bad news later than high-
AT firms. In other words, a valid AT measure should be able to predict bad news
recognition by low-AT firms following bad news recognition by high-AT firms. How-
ever, recognition of bad news by low-AT firms will not predict recognition of bad
news by high-AT firms.
I use negative earnings changes as proxy for recognition of bad news. This proxy
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has been used by Basu (1997) and other researchers, including Ball, Robin, and Wu
(2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). As Ball and Kothari (2007) discuss, negative
earnings change has an advantage over negative earnings as a proxy for recognition of
bad news because it is less susceptible to survivor bias, and negative earnings cannot
capture the event of recognition of bad news when firms recognize bad news but still
have positive earnings. Therefore, assuming firms in the same industry share common
bad news, I predict the following:
Hypothesis 1: Negative earnings changes of high-AT firms have a positive cor-
relation with future earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry.
Because AT implies timeliness in recognizing bad news but not good news, this
study does not predict any association between high-AT firms and low-AT firms in
recognizing good news, or positive earnings changes. I also do not expect to find any
predicting power of low-AT firms for high-AT firms’ earnings changes, regardless of
the sign of earnings changes. Therefore, I predict the following:
Hypothesis 1a: Positive earnings changes of high-AT firms are not associated
with future earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry.
Hypothesis 1b: Positive or negative earnings changes of low-AT firms are not
associated with future earnings changes of high-AT firms in the same industry.
I further investigate in which way low-AT firms recognize accumulated unrecog-
nized bad news, which has implications for the earnings persistence of a firm, which is
of interest to investors and debt holders. There are two ways for low-AT firms to recog-
nize bad news. They can recognize the accumulated bad news all at once, to maximize
future positive income increases (the earnings bath hypothesis). Or they can recognize
it slowly in a trickle, to minimize the magnitude of negative earnings changes (the
trickling-out hypothesis).
The earnings-bath hypothesis can be explained by managers’ incentive to maxi-
mize their compensation in the future by recognizing accumulated bad news all at
once in years when current bad news is too obvious not to recognize, and managers
are disqualified for the current year’s bonus payment regardless of recognition of bad
news. The trickling-out hypothesis can be warranted, for instance, by the incentive to
avoid debt covenant breaches, because spreading out recognition of bad news pro-
longs the timing of the debt covenant breach, other things being equal. Therefore,
whether a firm adopts the earnings-bath or trickling-out approach to recognizing accu-
mulated bad news is an empirical question.
These two hypotheses have a diverging prediction on cross-sectional differences
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between high-AT and low-AT firms in the likelihood of negative earnings changes. In
the big-bath world, low-AT firms will recognize accumulated bad news once after sev-
eral instances, while high-AT firms recognize bad news whenever it occurs. Therefore,
assuming there are multiple periods of bad news, the big-bath hypothesis predicts a
lower frequency of recognition of bad news in low-AT firms than in high-AT firms.
However, the trickling-out hypothesis predicts a higher likelihood of recognizing bad
news by low-AT firms than by high-AT firms, because low-AT firms spread out recog-
nition of the accumulated bad news through times of good news and bad news, while
high-AT firms recognize bad news only in times of bad news. Therefore, assuming
there are times of bad news and good news in any firm, the trickling-out hypothesis
predicts a higher frequency of recognition of bad news in low-AT firms than in high-
AT firms. Therefore my second hypothesis is (in the null hypothesis form):
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of future negative earnings changes is not associ-
ated with AT.
To further test how low-AT firms recognize accumulated bad news, I divide the
sample into good news times and bad news times. In the times of good news, high-AT
firms will not have any bad news (current or accumulated) to recognize, while low-AT
firms may recognize previously unrecognized, accumulated bad news. In a trickling-
out world, low-AT firms are more likely than high-AT firms to recognize bad news in
times of good news, because they spread out the accumulated bad news through both
good- and bad-news times.
In a big-bath world, two different predictions are possible. If low-AT firms take a
big-bath approach to amplify bad news for future quick turn-around of earnings, they
will not recognize the accumulated bad news during times of good news. In this case,
there should not be any difference in the frequency of recognizing bad news between
low-AT and high-AT firms. However, low-AT firms may recognize accumulated bad
news even during times of good news, if an incoming CEO recognizes the accumulat-
ed bad news in a transition year (Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993). In
this case, low-AT firms will have a higher frequency of recognizing bad news in times
of good news than high-AT firms.
In times of bad news, the trickling-out hypothesis predicts no difference between
low-AT firms and high-AT firms in the frequency of recognizing bad news, because
low-AT firms spread out the recognition of bad news throughout bad- and good-news
times. On the other hand, the big-bath hypothesis predicts that low-AT firms will have
a lower frequency of recognizing bad news than high-AT firms, because low-AT firms
recognize accumulated bad news once in several instances.
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The big-bath hypothesis and the trickling-out hypothesis also have a departing pre-
diction in cross-sectional difference between low-AT and high-AT firms in the magni-
tude of earnings changes. For negative earnings changes, the big-bath hypothesis pre-
dicts that low-AT firms will have a greater magnitude of earnings changes than high-
AT firms, because low-AT firms recognize all the accumulated bad news at one time.
However, the trickling-out hypothesis predicts that the magnitude of negative earnings
changes will be smaller for low-AT firms than for high-AT firms. That is because
high-AT firms recognize the bad news promptly and fully, while low-AT firms only
recognize a small portion of the accumulated bad news and defer the remainder to the
next period.
One may think, however, that the partial recognition of accumulated bad news by
low-AT firms can be greater than the full recognition of contemporaneous bad news
by high-AT firms. I argue, though, that the magnitude of bad news recognition by low-
AT firms will be smaller than that of high-AT firms if the motivation of low-AT firms
to trickle out bad news is to take benefits from contracts (for example debt covenants)
by reducing the magnitude of negative earnings changes.
For positive earnings changes, neither hypothesis predicts any difference in the
magnitude of earning changes between low-AT and high-AT firms. Therefore, my
third hypothesis is (in the null hypothesis form):
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of negative earnings changes is not associated
with AT.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE
Research Design
I follow Khan and Watts (2009) and Frankel and Roychowdhury (2007) in measur-
ing firm-specific AT. Khan and Watts suggest a firm-specific AT measure modifying
Basu’s regression. Their measure allows coefficients to vary across firms and over
time. The standard Basu (1997) regression is
Xi, t = β1,t + β2,t Di,t + β3,i,t Ri,t + β4,i,t Ri,t Di,t (1)
where i indexes the firm, t indexes time, X is earnings, R is returns (measuring news),
D is a dummy equal to 1 when R < 0 and 0 otherwise. Basu interprets positive β4 as
evidence of AT. Based on this standard Basu regression, Kahn and Watts (2007) allow
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both β3 and β4 to vary with leverage (LEV), market-to-book (MTB), size (Size), and
time as follows:
β3,i,t = µ1,t + µ2,t Sizei,t + µ3,t MTBi,t + µ4,t LEVi,t (2)
β4,i,t = λ1,t + λ2,t Sizei,t + λ3,t MTBi,t + λ4,t LEVi,t (3)
I substitute equation (2) and (3) in equation (1) and obtain the following empirical
model to estimate firm-specific AT:
Xi,t = β1,t + β2,t Di,t + Ri,t (µ1,t + µ2,t Sizei,t + µ3,t MTBi,t + µ4,t LEVi,t) +
Ri,t Di,t (λ1,t + λ2,t Sizei,t + λ3,t MTBi,t + λ4,t LEVi,t) (4)
Equation (4) is estimated using annual cross-sectional regressions, and a firm-spe-
cific annual AT measure, β4,i,t is then computed using equation (3).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that negative earnings changes of high-AT firms will precede
negative earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry. To test it, I first
divide the sample into a high-AT group and a low-AT group for each year within each
industry group defined by a two-digit SIC code, depending on whether a firm is above
or below the median industry AT level. Then, I calculate the mean of earnings changes
for each group. Finally, I run the following pool of time and industry regression:
∆XLAT,j,t+1 = β0 + β1* ∆XHAT,j,t + et (5)
where ∆XLAT,j, t+1 is mean earnings change of the low-AT group for industry j at time
t+1 and ∆XHAT,j,t is the mean earnings change of the high-AT group for industry j at
time t.
I use income before extraordinary item (data18 in Compustat) as earnings.
Hypotheses 1 and 1a predict that β1 will be positive when ∆XHAT,j,t is negative but β1
will not be significantly different from zero when ∆XHAT,j,t is positive. This implies
that recognition of bad news by firms in the high-AT group precedes recognition of bad
news by firms in the low-AT group in the same industry. By running this industry pool
regression, I expect to capture differential speed in recognizing industry-common bad
news and minimize any effect from earnings changes of an individual firm caused by
measurement error.1 See figure 1 in the Appendix for an illustration of how I calculate
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1. As Ball and Kothari (2007) argue, it is hard to differentiate whether transient negative earn-
ings changes come from AT or from prior measurement errors. Positive measurement
errors in the prior period can cause negative earnings changes in this period. However, this 
∆XLAT,j, t+1 and ∆XHAT,j,t.
I also run the following regression to test hypothesis 1b:
∆XHAT,j,t+1 = β0 + β1* ∆XLAT,j,t + et (6)
where ∆XHAT,j,t+1 is the mean earnings change of the high-AT group for industry j at
time t+1 and ∆XLAT,j,t is the mean earnings change of the low-AT group for industry j
at time t. Hypothesis 1b predicts that β1 will not be significantly different from zero
whether ∆XLAT,j,t is positive or negative.
To model the likelihood of negative earnings changes, I run the following logistic
regression model:
Neg_∆Xt+1 = β0 + β1*ATt + β2*ROAt + β3*EDFt + β4*Industry ROAt +
β5*StdRett + β6*MVEt + β7*MTBt+ β8*LEVt+
β9*Bad_Newst+1 + et (7)
where Neg_∆Xt+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if change of income before extra-
ordinary item (data18) from t to t+1 is negative, 0 otherwise. ROAt is return on assets
(data18/data6) at year t. EDFt is implied probability of bankruptcy based on the KMV
(Merton) bankruptcy model (Bharath & Shumway, 2004). Industry ROAt is the median
industry ROA for a firm’s four-digit SIC code. StdRett is a standard deviation of stock
returns over the window of 72 months with a minimum of 60 available months. MVEt,
MTBt, and LEVt are natural log of market value of equity (log[data25*data199 + 1]),
market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60) and leverage ratios of a firm (data181/
data6). Bad_Newst+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if stock returns at t+1 are nega-
tive, 0 otherwise.
The trickling-out hypothesis predicts that β1 will be negative, but the big-bath
hypothesis predicts that β1 will be positive. In times of good news, the trickling-out
hypothesis predicts that β1 will be negative, but the big-bath hypothesis predicts that
β1 will be either not significant or negative, depending on when the accumulated bad
news is released. In times of bad news, the trickling-out hypothesis predicts that β1
will not be significantly different from zero, but the big-bath hypothesis predicts that
β1 will be positive because the big-bath hypothesis suggests that low-AT firms recog-
nize accumulated bad news once after several instances. I use stock returns measured
over 12 months as a proxy for news. Positive returns suggest that there is good news
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effect will be less prominent when calculating a group mean instead of a firm-specific
earnings change, due to the potential offsetting effect of measurement error.
during the period, and negative returns suggest that there is bad news.
In testing hypothesis 3, I replace Neg_∆Xt+1 in model (7) above with ∆Xt+1, where
∆Xt+1 is change in income before extraordinary item (data18) from t to t+1. I divide
the full sample into subgroups depending on the sign of ∆Xt+1. In the negative earn-
ings changes group, the big-bath hypothesis predicts that β1 will be positive, because
low-AT firms recognize all the accumulated bad news at one time. On the other hand,
the trickling-out hypothesis predicts that β1 will be negative, because low-AT firms
only recognize a small portion of the accumulated bad news and defer the remainder
to the next period. In the positive earnings changes group, neither hypothesis predicts
that β1 will be significantly different from zero.
Sample Selection
My sample consists of all firms on the intersection of 2008 Compustat and CRSP
databases with sufficient data to compute the AT measure, earnings changes, and other
control variables. To minimize any time series dependence concerns, I include time
fixed effects in all my multivariate analyses. To control for any firm-level or industry-
level clustering, I use cluster-adjusted standard errors for the statistical significance
tests (Petersen, 2007).
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of table 12 summarizes the descriptive statistics for key variables used in
this analysis. Firms in the sample are on average asymmetric timely (median: 2.55)
and have positive earnings (median: 0.05). However, accruals have a decreasing
impact on earnings (median: -0.05), while operating cash flow has an income-increas-
ing impact (median: 0.10). These results are consistent with prior literature that shows
firms are overall conservative and have negative accruals (Basu, 1997; Givoly &
Hayn, 2000). Operating cash flow is data308 in Compustat if observation is after the
year 1987, and is otherwise calculated as operating income before depreciation minus
interest minus taxes minus changes in non-cash working capital (Dechow, Kothari &
Watts, 1998).
Accruals are the difference between income before extraordinary item and operat-
ing cash flows. In an untabulated result, 35 percent of firms have negative stock return
while 53 percent of firms have negative earnings changes in t+1. This implies that the
sample is balanced between positive and negative earnings change sub-groups to test
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2. All tables are in the appendix.
the third hypothesis, but is imbalanced between good news and bad news sub-groups
for the test of the second hypothesis. I do not expect this to cause any significant issue,
though, given that the sample size is sufficient. My sample covers 36 SIC-two-digit
industries and 23 years (1983 to 2005). None of thesubgroup of industry code or year
is greater than 8 percent of the total sample, which implies that the sample is not domi-
nated by one specific industry or year.
Panel B of table 1 summarizes Pearson correlations among variables in the sample.
The AT measure has a negative relation with the size of the firm, but a positive corre-
lation with leverage. This is consistent with prior literature and implies that more
diverse firms are less asymmetric timely and debt contract demands AT. However, AT
has a negative association with market-to-book ratio (MTB), which sometimes is used
as an alternative conservatism measure.
This negative association has been explained by prior literature, including Ball and
Kothari (2007) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). Earnings have a positive rela-
tion with accruals and operating cash flows, which are two components of earnings.
Accruals have a negative association with operating cash flow, which implies a typical
contemporaneous negative association between the two (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).
Accruals have a negative association with future accruals change but a positive associ-
ation with future cash flow change. This can be explained by accruals reversal and
accruals’ role of mitigating the timing lag in cash flows. Overall, the table shows that
the correlation among variables is consistent with prior literature.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Empirical Results of the Test of Hypothesis 1
As explained above, I calculate mean earnings changes for the low-AT group and
high-AT group for each industry.3 Then I estimate equation (5) and (6) to test hypothe-
sis 1. Panel A of table 2 shows that negative earnings changes of high-AT firms pre-
dict next-period negative earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry (β1 is
0.108 with a p-value of 0.05). This relation does not hold when earnings changes of
high-AT firms are positive (p-value: 0.22).
I also statistically test whether β1 is greater in the negative earnings changes sub-
group than in the positive earnings changes sub-group. The result, shown in the bot-
tom of panel A of table 2, shows that β1 in the negative earnings changes sub-group is
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3. Using median instead of mean does not change the results.
statistically greater than in the positive earnings changes sub-group (p-value is 0.03).
These results suggest that only negative earnings changes in high-AT firms can predict
future earnings changes in low-AT firms, and predicting power is statistically greater
when high-AT firms’ earnings changes are negative. This asymmetric predicting
power of high-AT firms supports both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 1a, which predict a
positive association between the negative earnings changes of high-AT firms and the
future earnings changes of low-AT firms in the same industry, but no association
between the positive earnings changes of high-AT firms and the future earnings
changes of low-AT firms. Panel B of table 2 shows that neither negative earnings
changes nor positive earnings changes of low-AT firms are associated with the future
earnings changes of high-AT firms. None of the coefficients is significant, and there is
no predicting power difference between the negative earnings change sub-group and
the positive earnings change sub-group. This supports hypothesis 1b.
One may think that different characteristics of the high-AT and low-AT groups
may drive the results in hypothesis 1. Before further investigating this concern, I com-
pared firm characteristics between the low-AT and high-AT groups (panel A of table
3). While there is no difference between frequency of bad news and size of sales, the
two groups are quite different in other characteristics. Firms in the low-AT group are
more profitable and larger and have higher cash flow, MTB, and leverage ratio. There-
fore, I include these different firm characteristic variables as control variables in equa-
tion (5) to confirm that the result shown in table 2 is not compounded by the difference
in firm characteristics. The result is reported in panel B of table 3.
With these control variables, adjusted R-squares jump from 42 percent to 50 per-
cent, and the predicting power of the high-AT group is even stronger and more statisti-
cally significant. In model (2), I include all the firm characteristics that are shown in
panel A of table 3 and find that β1 is still positive and significant. In model (3), I
include a bad news dummy variable to address any concerns that difference of bad
news at time t+1 in the low-AT and high-AT groups may drive the result. The result is
still robust on this specification. R-squares were 47 percent, and β1 is statistically sig-
nificant at 1 percent or lower level. Magnitude of β1 also more than doubled compared
to the simple model, implying that the predicting power of the negative earnings
changes of the high-AT group on the future earnings changes of the low-AT group
becomes stronger with control variables. This suggests that the level of AT is useful in
predicting the future earnings changes of firms in the same industry, over and beyond
general firm characteristics such as size. In the last specification, I excluded the indus-
tries of finance and insurance from the sample to relieve concerns on whether these
regulated industries drive the result. The result was still robust in this specification.
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Empirical Results of the Test of Hypothesis 2
I run a logistic regression of equation (7) to test the relation between the likelihood
of negative earnings changes and AT. The dependent variable in this model is
Neg_∆Xt+1, a dummy variable that equals 1 if change of income before extraordinary
item (data18) from t to t+1 is negative, 0 otherwise. The equation also includes year
dummies to control for year effects, but coefficients are not reported to save space.
The first specification of table 4 reports the result of logistic regression of equation (7)
using the full sample. The model chi-square statistic is 1,912.9 and is highly signifi-
cant (p < 0.0001).
The result shows that there is a negative association between AT and likelihood of
future negative earnings changes (p-value: 0.03). This finding supports the trickling-
out hypothesis, which predicts that low-AT firms spread out past bad news over time
rather than taking a “big bath,” and as a result, have a higher likelihood of negative
earnings changes than high-AT firms. This model includes a dummy variable,
Bad_newst+1, to control for potential difference of occurrence of bad news at time t+1.
Bad_newst+1 is 1 if stock return at t+1 is negative and 0 otherwise.
In the second and the third specification, I report the results of logistic regression of
the equation (7) in two sub-groups. I subdivide the full sample into a bad news group
and a good news group, depending on stock return at t+1. While β1 in the bad news
group is not significant, β1 in the good news group is significantly negative. These
results again support the trickling-out hypothesis. While there is no difference between
low-AT and high-AT firms in the frequency of recognition of bad news during times
of bad news, the trickling-out hypothesis predicts that low-AT firms will have a higher
frequency of recognition of bad news in good news times, because low-AT firms
spread out the recognition of bad news. In good news times, high-AT firms do not
have bad news to recognize, but low-AT firms spill over the accumulated bad news
and realize negative earnings changes. On the other hand, the big-bath hypothesis pre-
dicts positive β1 in bad news times and negative or nonsignificant β1 in good news
times, as discussed above. The magnitude of β1 is marginally greater and more signifi-
cant in the good news sub-sample than in the full sample. Overall, the results in table 4
lend evidence that low-AT firms recognize accumulated bad news slowly rather than
all at once.
Empirical Results of the Test of Hypothesis 3
To test an association of magnitude of earnings changes and AT, I subdivide the
full sample into two sub-samples depending on the sign of earnings changes at t+1.
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The trickling-out hypothesis predicts a negative association between AT and earnings
changes in the negative earnings changes sub-sample but no association in the positive
earnings changes sub-sample. The big-bath hypothesis predicts a positive association
between AT and earnings changes in the negative earnings changes sub-sample but no
association in the positive earnings changes sub-sample. That is because both low-AT
and high-AT firms are expected to equally recognize good news in earnings during
good news times.
Panel A of table 5 shows regression results for the negative earnings changes sub-
sample. β1 is negative and significant in model (1). In models (2) and (3), I include
Bad_newst+1 and Neg_OCFt+1 to control negative shock at t+1, where Neg_OCFt+1 is
1 if operating cash flow at t+1 is negative and 0 otherwise. β1 continues to be negative
and significant. Panel B of table 5 shows that β1 is not significant in the positive earn-
ings changes sub-sample. Overall the results in table 5 support the trickling-out
hypothesis.
I further test whether the results of table 5 are driven by accruals or cash flows. If
firms delay recognition of bad news and decide to incorporate it into earnings slowly,
one would predict that managers smooth negative earnings changes through accruals,
not through cash flows, because managers have flexibility over accruals but not over
cash flows. I test this prediction, and the results support it. In table 6, I test association
between AT and changes in accruals at t+1. β1 is negative and significant for the nega-
tive earnings change sub-group but not significant for the positive earnings change
sub-group. In table 7, I test an association between AT and changes in operating cash
flows at t+1. β1 is not significant in either the positive or the negative earnings
changes sub-group. This confirms conjecture that managers recognize delayed bad
news through accruals.
CONCLUSION
I provide evidence that negative earnings changes of high-AT firms predict future
negative earnings changes of low-AT firms. However, I do not find evidence that earn-
ings changes of low-AT firms predict future earnings changes of high-AT firms. I also
find that the likelihood of negative earnings changes is greater for low-AT firms, espe-
cially when there is good news. My results also show that the magnitude of negative
earnings changes is smaller for low-AT firms, and these negative earnings changes are
mostly driven by accruals. These results suggest that low-AT firms trickle out the
accumulated unrecognized bad news rather than taking an earnings bath.
This study has provided evidence that AT measured by nonlinear regression of
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earnings on returns captures firms’ differential timeliness in recognizing bad news. It
also contributes to the conservatism literature by providing evidence that low-AT
firms tend to recognize accumulated bad news slowly rather than all at once. Under-
standing of how firms recognize accumulated bad news offers implications for pre-
dicting future earnings.
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Figure 1. Calculating ∆XLAT,j, t+1 and ∆XHAT,j, t
The figure shows that how I calculate ∆XLAT,j, t+1 and ∆XHAT,j, t. X is earnings, defined as income before extra-
ordinary items (data 18 in Compustat). ∆XLAT,j, t+1 is earnings change from year t to year t+1 for Low AT (LAT)
group. ∆XHAT,j, t is earnings change from year t to year t+1 for High AT (HAT) group. b4,i,t is a coefficient from
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Key Variables in the Analysis
The sample consists of all firms in the 2008 CRSP/Compustat merged dataset with sufficiently available data.
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). X is earnings, defined as income
before extraordinary items (data 18 in Compustat). ACC is operating accruals, defined as the difference
between earnings and operating cash flow. OCF is operating cash flow (data 308). MVE is natural log of mar-
ket value of equity (log[data25*data199+1]). MTB is market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60). LEV is
leverage ratio (data181/data6). StdRet is a standard deviation of stock returns over the window of 72 months
with a minimum of 60 available months. ∆Xt+1 is change of earnings from t to t+1. *, **, and *** indicate sig-
nificance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.
Panel A. Univariate Statistics
Lower Upper
Variable N Mean
Std Dev Quartile Median Quartile
AT 26,986 5.921 15.185 1.545 2.555 7.161
X 25,294 0.042 0.162 0.013 0.050 0.098
ACC 22,237 -0.0559 0.138 -0.093 -0.050 -0.012
OCF 22,237 0.099 0.145 0.047 0.101 0.162
MVE 26,986 6.665 1.613 5.485 6.605 7.765
MTB 26,986 3.0606 3.733 1.454 2.172 3.507
LEV 26,986 0.538 0.243 0.357 0.538 0.703
StdRet 25,794 0.127 0.064 0.084 0.111 0.153
∆Xt+1 25,991 -0.099 14957.000 -0.027 -0.001 0.016
Panel B. Pearson Correlations
X ACC OCF MVE MTB LEV ∆Xt+1 ∆ACCt+1 ∆OCFt+1
AT -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 0.01
X 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.10*** 0.01* -0.07*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
ACC -0.25*** -0.05*** -0.10*** 0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** 0.02***
OCF 0.18*** 0.10*** -0.08*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02***
MVE 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.01 0.01 -0.01
MTB -0.12*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
LEV 0.01** 0.01** -0.01**
∆Xt+1 0.99*** -0.99***
∆ACCt+1 -1.00*** 
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Table 2. OLS Regression Result of Association between Low-AT Earnings Changes and High-AT
Earnings Changes
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). X is earnings, defined as income
before extraordinary item (data 18 in Compustat). ∆Xt+1 is change of earnings from t to t+1. ∆Xt is change of
earnings from t-1 to t. Subscript HAT means high-AT firms (defined as firms below mean of AT for each year
and industry). Subscript LAT HAT means high-AT firms.
Panel A. Regression of Future Low-AT Earnings Changes on Current High-AT Earnings Changes
Dependent Variable: ∆XLAT,t+1
Variables ∆XHAT,t < 0 ∆XHAT,t > 0
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept (β0) 0.0011 0.7744 0.0109 0.0634
∆XHAT,t (β1) 0.1080 0.0527 0.0220 0.2274
Industry fixed effects yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 9.4 7.4
N 471 325
F Value p-value
Difference in β1 4.61 0.0322
Panel B. Regression of Future High-AT Earnings Changes on Current Low-AT Earnings Changes
Dependent Variable: ∆XHAT,t+1
Variables ∆XLAT,t < 0 ∆XLAT,t > 0
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept (β0) -0.0120 0.0227 -0.0067 0.3722
∆XLAT,t (β1) -0.1223 0.2459 0.0440 0.535
Industry fixed effects yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 7.2 6.1
N 407 390
F Value p-value
Difference in β1 0.13 0.723 
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Table 3. OLS Regression Result of Future Low-AT Earnings Changes on Current High-AT Earnings
Changes with Control Variables
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). Bad_Newst+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if stock returns
at t+1 are negative, 0 otherwise. ROA is return on asset (data18/data6). OCF is operating cash flow (data 308). MVE is natural
log of market value of equity (log[data25*data199+1]). MTB is market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60). LEV is leverage
ratio (data181/data6). ∆Xt+1 is change of earnings from t to t+1. X is earnings defined as income before extraordinary item (data
18 in Compustat). Subscript LAT means low-AT firms (defined as firms below mean of AT for each year and industry). Subscript
HAT means high-AT firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level respectively.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Low-AT Group and High-AT Group
LAT (N=797) HAT (N=797) Difference
Variable
Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median t Value Pr > |t|
AT 1.684 12.984 -1.042 8.978 13.519 5.090 -41.85 <.0001
Bad_News 0.369 0.224 0.333 0.379 0.213 0.361 -1.02 0.31
ROA 0.077 0.064 0.079 0.050 0.168 0.049 4.35 <.0001
OCF/Asset 0.125 0.071 0.126 0.079 0.215 0.092 5.40 <.0001
Sales/Asset 1.414 0.850 1.330 1.619 3.264 1.456 -1.80 0.07
MVE 7.315 1.090 7.346 5.778 1.129 5.610 31.70 <.0001
MTB 3.151 1.670 2.752 2.307 1.150 2.028 13.80 <.0001
LEV 0.513 0.162 0.493 0.565 0.145 0.551 -11.28 <.0001
∆Xt+1 -0.008 0.035 -0.005 -0.012 0.179 -0.004 0.65 0.51
Panel B. Regression of Future Low-AT Earnings Changes on Current High-AT Earnings Changes with Control Variables
Dependent Variable: ∆XLAT,t+1
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Except SIC 60’s
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Intercept (β0) 0.0011 0.77 -0.0020 0.92 0.0089 0.63 0.0058 0.80
∆XHAT,t (β1) 0.1080 0.05 0.1069 0.04 0.2840 0.00 0.2791 0.00
LEVLAT,t (β2) -0.0035 0.88 -0.0149 0.49 -0.0145 0.51
MVELAT,t (β3) 0.0015 0.70 0.0037 0.36 0.0067 0.06
MTBLAT,t (β4) -0.0005 0.78 -0.0009 0.62 -0.0010 0.58
XLAT,t (β5) -0.4231 0.00 -0.4039 0.00 -0.4268 0.00
SaleLAT,t (β6) 0.0103 0.03 0.0064 0.16 0.0000 0.99
OCFLAT,t (β7) 0.1224 0.05 0.1421 0.01 0.1933 0.01
LEVHAT,t (β8) 0.0049 0.80 0.0083 0.64 0.0000 1.00
MVEHAT,t (β9) 0.0026 0.60 0.0006 0.91 -0.0046 0.26
MTBHAT,t (β10) 0.0017 0.27 0.0014 0.41 0.0008 0.69
XHAT,t (β11) -0.0455 0.30 -0.1348 0.01 -0.1139 0.07
SALEHAT,t (β12) -0.0017 0.56 0.0024 0.37 0.0095 0.02
OCFHAT,t (β13) -0.0668 0.01 -0.0724 0.00 -0.0873 0.02
Bad_NewsLAT,t+1 (β14) -0.0117 0.14 -0.0161 0.06
Bad_NewsHAT,t+1 (β15) -0.0123 0.09 -0.0061 0.32
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 9.4 42.5 47 50
N 471 365 347 317 
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Table 4. Asymmetric Timeliness and Likelihood of Negative Earnings Changes
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). X is earnings defined as income
before extraordinary item (data 18 in Compustat). Neg_∆Xt+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if change of earnings
from t to t+1 is negative, 0 otherwise. ROA is return on asset (data18/data6). EDF is implied probability of
bankruptcy based on KMV (Merton) bankruptcy model. Industry ROA is median industry ROA for a firm’s
four-digit SIC code. StdRet is standard deviation of stock returns over the window of 72 months. MVE is natural
log of market value of equity (log[data25*data199+1]). MTB is market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60).
LEV is leverage ratio (data181/data6). Bad_Newst+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if stock returns at t+1 are negative,
0 otherwise.
Dependent Variable: Neg_∆Xt+1
Variables Full Sample Bad News Good News
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Intercept (β0) -0.2999 0.03 0.6312 0.01 -0.3973 0.01
ATt(β1) -0.0061 0.03 0.0020 0.70 -0.0083 0.02
ROAt(β2) 4.7860 0.00 4.5478 0.00 5.0045 0.00
EDFt(β3) -0.4033 0.02 -0.0644 0.83 -0.5980 0.01
Industry ROAt(β4) -1.1987 0.00 -0.6859 0.07 -1.3877 0.00
StdRett(β5) 2.0364 0.00 2.3103 0.00 1.9504 0.00
MVEt(β6) -0.0583 0.00 -0.0811 0.00 -0.0452 0.00
MTBt(β7) -0.0319 0.00 -0.0335 0.00 -0.0328 0.00
LEVt(β8) 0.2727 0.00 -0.1304 0.33 0.4770 0.00
Bad_Newst+1(β9) 0.8601 0.00
Model chi-square 1,912.90 529.6 840.9
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
N 22,952 8,237 14,715
Obs. where Neg_∆Xt+1 = 1 12,173 5,336 6,837
Obs. where Neg_∆Xt+1 = 0 10,779 2,901 7,878
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Table 5. Asymmetric Timeliness and Magnitude of Earnings Changes
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). X is earnings defined as income
before extraordinary item (data 18 in Compustat). ∆Xt+1 is change of earnings from t to t+1. ROA is return on
asset (data18/data6). EDF is implied probability of bankruptcy based on KMV (Merton) bankruptcy model.
Industry ROA is median industry ROA for a firm’s four-digit SIC code. StdRet is standard deviation of stock
returns over the window of 72 months. MVE is natural log of market value of equity (log[data25*data199+1]).
MTB is market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60). LEV is leverage ratio (data181/data6). Bad_Newst+1 is
a dummy equal to 1 if stock returns at t+1 are negative, 0 otherwise. Neg_OCFt+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if
operating cash flow at t+1 is negative, 0 otherwise. Operating cash flow is data308 in Compustat. Negative
(positive) earnings change sub-sample is composed of firms for which ∆Xt+1 is negative (positive).
Panel A. Negative Earnings Change Sub-sample
Dependent Variable: Neg_∆Xt+1
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept(β0) 0.0156 0.22 0.0237 0.06 0.0321 0.02
ATt(β1) -0.0005 0.02 -0.0004 0.03 -0.0005 0.02
ROAt(β2) -0.1045 0.05 -0.1101 0.04 -0.1466 0.01
EDFt(β3) -0.0203 0.07 -0.0193 0.08 -0.0171 0.14
Industry ROAt(β4) 0.1152 0.00 0.1168 0.00 0.0969 0.01
StdRett(β5) -0.4793 0.00 -0.4834 0.00 -0.4498 0.00
MVEt(β6) 0.0017 0.04 0.0016 0.06 0.0001 0.93
MTBt(β7) -0.0039 0.00 -0.0039 0.00 -0.0037 0.00
LEVt(β8) 0.0311 0.00 0.0003 0.00 0.0449 0.00
Bad_Newst+1(β9) -0.015 0.00 -0.0146 0.00
Neg_OCFt+1(β10) -0.0470 0.00
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 11.22 11.5 13
N 11,337 11,337 11,337
Panel B. Positive Earnings Change Sub-sample
Dependent Variable: ∆Xt+1
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept(β0) 0.0711 0.00 0.0762 0.00 0.0783 0.00
ATt(β1) 0.0001 0.44 0.0001 0.43 0.0001 0.33
ROAt(β2) -0.5963 0.00 -0.5996 0.00 -0.6162 0.00
EDFt(β3) -0.0028 0.69 -0.0036 0.61 -0.0023 0.74
Industry ROAt(β4) 0.1147 0.02 0.1121 0.02 0.0936 0.03
StdRett(β5) 0.0354 0.50 0.0322 0.54 0.0358 0.47
MVEt(β6) 0.0027 0.02 0.0026 0.02 0.0018 0.07
MTBt(β7) 0.0031 0.00 0.0031 0.00 0.0032 0.00
LEVt(β8) -0.0899 0.00 -0.0894 0.00 -0.0741 0.00
Bad_Newst+1(β9) -0.0159 0.00 -0.0153 0.00
Neg_OCFt+1(β10) -0.0372 0.00
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 69.7 70.1 71.1
N 10,779 10,779 10,779 
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Table 6. Asymmetric Timeliness and Accruals Changes
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). X is earnings defined as income
before extraordinary item (data 18 in Compustat). ∆ACCt+1 is change of accruals from t to t+1, where accru-
als are defined as difference between earnings and operating cash flow (data308). ROA is return on asset
(data18/data6). EDF is implied probability of bankruptcy based on KMV (Merton) bankruptcy model. Industry
ROA is median industry ROA for a firm’s four-digit SIC code. StdRet is standard deviation of stock returns
over the window of 72 months. MVE is natural log of market value of equity (log[data25*data199+1]). MTB is
market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60). LEV is leverage ratio (data181/data6). Bad_Newst+1 is a dummy
equal to 1 if stock returns at t+1 are negative, 0 otherwise. Neg_OCFt+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if operating
cash flow at t+1 is negative, 0 otherwise. Sub-sample is composed of either positive or negative earnings
change at t+1.
Dependent Variable: ∆ACCt+1
Variables ∆Xt+1 < 0 ∆Xt+1 > 0
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept (β0) -0.0005 0.63 0.0305 0.10
ATt(β1) -0.0005 0.08 -0.0002 0.50
ROAt(β2) -0.0973 0.13 -0.4593 0.00
EDFt(β3) -0.0481 0.02 0.0224 0.19
Industry ROAt(β4) 0.1154 0.01 0.1766 0.01
StdRett(β5) -0.3059 0.00 -0.0808 0.23
MVEt(β6) 0.0045 0.00 0.0050 0.01
MTBt(β7) -0.0017 0.15 0.0014 0.01
LEVt(β8) 0.0001 0.99 -0.0577 0.01
Bad_Newst+1(β9) -0.0100 0.00 -0.0110 0.01
Neg_OCFt+1(β10) 0.0072 0.57 0.0398 0.04
Firm fixed effects yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 4.4 35.6
N 9,395 8,802 
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Table 7. Asymmetric Timeliness and Operating Cash Flow Changes
AT is Asymmetric Timeliness measured following Khan and Watts (2009). X is earnings defined as income
before extraordinary item (data 18 in Compustat). ∆OCFt+1 is change of operating cash flow (data308) from t
to t+1. ROA is return on asset (data18/data6). EDF is implied probability of bankruptcy based on KMV (Merton)
bankruptcy model. Industry ROA is median industry ROA for a firm’s four-digit SIC code. StdRet is standard
deviation of stock returns over the window of 72 months. MVE is natural log of market value of equity
(log[data25*data199+1]). MTB is market-to-book ratio (data25*data199/data60). LEV is leverage ratio
(data181/data6). Bad_Newst+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if stock returns at t+1 are negative, 0 otherwise.
Neg_OCFt+1 is a dummy equal to 1 if operating cash flow at t+1 is negative, 0 otherwise. Sub-sample is com-
posed of either positive or negative earnings change at t+1.
Dependent Variable: ∆OCFt+1
Variables ∆Xt+1 < 0 ∆Xt+1 > 0
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Intercept (β0) 0.0283 0.03 0.0487 0.00
ATt(β1) 0.0012 0.63 0.0035 0.14
ROAt(β2) -0.0747 0.05 -0.1723 0.00
EDFt(β3) 0.0458 0.01 -0.0209 0.18
Industry ROAt(β4) -0.0208 0.32 -0.0872 0.00
StdRett(β5) -0.0917 0.04 0.1342 0.00
MVEt(β6) -0.0041 0.00 -0.0031 0.01
MTBt(β7) -0.0020 0.00 0.0017 0.00
LEVt(β8) 0.0226 0.03 -0.0208 0.05
Bad_Newst+1(β9) -0.0057 0.02 -0.0068 0.02
Neg_OCFt+1(β10) -0.0855 0.00 -0.0985 0.00
Firm fixed effects yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
Adj-R2 (%) 7.5 14.3
N 9,395 8,802 
